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Abstract Network based intrusions have become a serious threat to the users 
of the Internet. Intruders who wish to attack computers attached to the Internet 
frequently conceal their identity by staging their attacks through intermediate 
“stepping stones”. This makes tracing the source of the attack substantially 
more difficult, particularly if the attack traffic is encrypted. In this paper, we 
address the problem of tracing encrypted connections through stepping stones.  
The incoming and outgoing connections through a stepping stone must be 
correlated to accomplish this. We propose a novel correlation scheme based on 
inter-packet timing characteristics of both encrypted and unencrypted 
connections. We show that (after some filtering) inter-packet delays (IPDs) of 
both encrypted and unencrypted, interactive connections are preserved across 
many router hops and stepping stones. The effectiveness of this method for 
correlation purposes also requires that timing characteristics be distinctive 
enough to identify connections. We have found that normal interactive 
connections such as telnet, SSH and rlogin are almost always distinctive enough 
to provide correct correlation across stepping stones.  The number of packets 
needed to correctly correlate two connections is also an important metric, and is 
shown to be quite modest for this method.  
1 Introduction 
Network-based intrusions have become a serious threat to users of the Internet. 
Today, perpetrators can attack networked information systems from virtually 
anywhere in the world. 
 One major problem in apprehending and stopping network-based intrusion is that 
the intruders can easily hide their identity and point of origin through readily available 
means. One of the techniques most commonly used by intruders is to hide their origin 
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by connecting across multiple stepping stones 
[4, 14, 18] before attacking the final 
targets. For example, an attacker logged into host A may telnet into host B, and from 
there launch an attack on host C.  An analysis of the traffic at C will only reveal it is 
being attacked from B, but will not identify the actual source of the attack.  A careful 
inspection of the contents of the traffic coming into and going out of B may reveal 
that A is the source of the attack.  However, if the traffic arriving at B is encrypted 
(using SSH 
[7,16] or IPSEC 
[3])
 before being transmitted to C, it will not be possible to 
use the traffic contents for correlation purposes. Network-based intruders thus have an 
easy way to launch attacks without revealing their identity.  Without a means of 
effectively and quickly tracing the source of an attack back to its source, it will not be 
possible to stop further attacks or punish those who are responsible. 
In this paper, we address the problem of correlating the incoming and outgoing 
connections of a stepping stone.  The goal is to identify which connections are part of 
an attack path, so that the attack can be traced back to its source. We assume that 
attack traffic may be encrypted at any stepping stone in an attempt to interfere with 
correlation. We propose a novel scheme based on the inter-packet timing 
characteristics of both encrypted and unencrypted connections. While, as with most 
intrusion tracing and detection systems, out correlation scheme could be evaded by 
highly sophisticated intruders, it is our goal to make it difficult to do so and thus deter 
network-based intrusions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give a 
summary of related works. In section 3, we formulate the correlation problem of our 
focus and give our correlation problem solution model. In section 4, we discuss IPD 
(Inter-Packet Delay) based correlation in detail. In section 5, we evaluate correlation 
effectiveness of our proposed correlation metrics through experiments. In section 5, 
we conclude with summary of our findings. 
2 Related  Work 
Table 2.1: Classification of Correlation and Tracing Approaches 
 PASSIVE  ACTIVE 
Host-Based DIDS 
[10] 
CIS 
[2] 
 
Network-Based Thumb  printing 
[14] 
ON/OFF-Based 
[18] 
Deviation-Based 
[17] 
IDIP 
[9] 
SWT 
[16] 
IPD-Based 
(proposed method) 
 
Most of the existing work on correlating connections across stepping stones assumes 
the traffic is unencrypted. In general, attack tracing approaches can be categorized as 
either being host-based or network-based.  In a host-based approach, the stepping 
stone itself participates in the tracing, while in the network-based approaches, the 
stepping stones are not used for tracing purposes.  Based on how the traffic is traced, Inter-Packet Delay Based Correlation for Tracing Encrypted Connections Through 
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tracing approaches can further be classified as either active or passive. Passive 
approaches monitor and compare all traffic, allowing any traffic to be traced at any 
time. On the other hand, active approaches dynamically control when, where, what 
and how the traffic is to be correlated, through customized packet processing. They 
only trace the traffic of interest when needed. Table 2.1 provides a classification of 
existing tracing approaches, as well as our proposed tracing mechanism. 
The Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS) 
[10] developed at UC Davis is a 
host-based tracing mechanism that attempts to keep track of all the users in the 
network and report all activities to network-wide intrusion detection systems. The 
Caller Identification System (CIS)
 [2] is another host-based tracing mechanism. It 
eliminates centralized control by utilizing a truly distributed model. Each host along 
the connection chain keeps a record about its view of the connection chain so far.  
A fundamental problem with the host-based tracing approach is its trust model. 
Host-based tracing places its trust upon the monitored hosts themselves. In specific, it 
depends on the correlation of connections at every host in the connection chain. If one 
host is compromised and is providing misleading correlation information, the whole 
tracing system is fooled. Because host-based tracing requires the participation and 
trust of every host involved in the network-based intrusion, it is very difficult to be 
applied in the context of the public Internet. 
Network-based tracing is the other category of tracing approaches. It does not 
require the participation of monitored hosts, nor does it place its trust on the 
monitored hosts. Rather, it is based on the assumption that one or more properties of a 
connection chain is maintained throughout the chain. In particular, the thumbprint 
[14] 
is a pioneering correlation technique that utilizes a small quantity of information to 
summarize connections. Ideally it can uniquely distinguish a connection from 
unrelated connections and correlate successfully those connections in the same 
connection chain.  
Sleepy Watermark Tracing (SWT) 
[[16]] applies principles of steganography and 
active networking in tracing and correlating unencrypted connections through 
stepping stones. By injecting watermarks in the traffic echoed back to the attacker, 
SWT is able to trace and correlate even a single keystroke by the intruder. By actively 
generating tracing traffic, it can trace and correlate even when an intrusion connection 
is idle. 
IDIP (the Intrusion Identification and Isolation Protocol) 
[9] is a part of Boeing’s 
Dynamic Cooperating Boundary Controllers Program that uses an active approach to 
trace the incoming path and source of the intrusion. In this method, boundary 
controllers collaboratively locate and block the intruder by exchanging intrusion 
detection information, namely, attack descriptions.  
The ON/OFF-based scheme 
[18] by Zhang and Paxson is the first correlation 
intended to correlate traffic across stepping stones even if the traffic is encrypted by 
the stepping stone. The method is based on correlation of the ends of OFF periods (or 
equivalently the beginnings of ON periods) of interactive traffic, rather than the 
connection contents. While it is robust against payload padding, ON/OFF-based 
correlation requires that the packets of connections have precise, synchronized 
timestamps in order to be able to correlate them.  This makes correlations of 
measurements taken at different points in the network difficult or impractical.  4      Xinyuan Wang†, Douglas S. Reeves†‡, S. Felix Wu†† 
The deviation-based approach 
[17] by Yoda and Etoh is another network-based 
correlation scheme. It defines the minimum average delay gap between the packet 
streams of two TCP connections as the deviation. The deviation-based approach 
considers both the packet timing characteristics and their TCP sequence numbers.  It 
does not require clock synchronization and is able to correlate connections observed 
at different points of network. However, it can only correlate TCP connections that 
have one-to-one correspondences in their TCP sequence numbers, and thus is not able 
to correlate connections where padding is added to the payload, e.g., when certain 
types of encryption are used.  
Both ON/OFF-based and deviation-based approaches define their correlation 
metrics over the entire duration of the connections to be correlated. This makes the 
correlation applicable to post-attack traces only.  
The IPD-based approach we discuss in the remainder of the paper defines its 
correlation metric over the sliding window of packets of the connections to be 
correlated. This enables it to correlate both live traffic (at real-time) and collected 
traces (post-attack). It supports distributed correlation of traffic measure at different 
points of network and is robust against payload padding. 
3  Problem Formulation  
A connection ci  (also called a flow) is a single connection from computer host Hi (the 
source) to host Hi+1 (the destination).  A user may log into a sequence of hosts H1, H2, 
… Hn+1 through a connection chain c1, c2, … cn, where connection ci is a remote login 
from host Hi to host Hi+1.1  The tracing problem is, given connection cn, to determine 
the other connections c1, c2, … cn-1 in the chain, and only those connections.  From 
these connections the identities of all the hosts in the chain, including H1, may be 
directly determined.2 
3.1  Correlation Problem Solution Model 
Let Ĉ represent the set of all connections being examined.  We can define an ideal 
correlation function CF: Ĉ × Ĉ → {0, 1} such that CF(ci, cj) = 1 iff ci and cj are in the 
same connection chain, otherwise CF(ci, cj) = 0.  To solve the tracing problem we 
must find such a function CF. 
In practice, connection correlation is based on the characteristics of the 
connections, which may include packet contents, header information (such as packet 
size) and packet arrival and/or departure times. The connection characteristics can be 
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modeled by a metric function of the connection 
 M:  Ĉ × P → Z (3.1) 
Where  Ĉ  is the set of connections to be correlated, P is some domain of 
parameters and Z is the correlation metric domain. 
Based on the connection metric, a correlation value function (CVF) can be defined 
as 
 CVF:  Z × Z → [0, 1]  (3.2) 
Where the result of CVF is a real number between 0 and 1. To approximate CF 
through CVF, we introduce a threshold 0 ≤ δ  ≤  1 such that ci and cj are considered 
correlated iff  
 CVF(M(ci, p), M(cj, p)) ≥ δ (3.3) 
Therefore the tracing problem is now replaced by the following: find or construct 
M, p, CVF and δ  such that 
 
∀ci,cj ∈ Ĉ , CVF(M(ci, p), M(cj, p)) ≥ δ 
 iff  ci and cj are in the same connection chain  (3.4) 
 
In finding M, p, CVF and δ, the key is to identify those unique characteristics of 
connections that are invariant across routers and stepping-stones. If those identified 
invariant characteristics of connections are distinctive enough to exclude other 
unrelated connections, reliable correlation of connections can be constructed from 
these metrics. 
4  IPD Based Correlation of Encrypted Connections 
In principle, correlation of connections is based on inherent characteristics of 
connections. To correlate potentially encrypted connections, the key is to identify a 
correlation metric from the connection characteristics that is: 1) invariant across 
routers and stepping stones; 2) not affected by encryption and decryption; 3) unique to 
each connection chain.  Potential candidates for the correlation metric of a flow of 
packets include header information, packet size, inter-packet timing etc. In particular, 
inter-packet timing should not be affected by encryption and decryption. We now 
present an original correlation method based on inter-packet delays or IPDs. 
4.1  General IPD Based Correlation Model 
The overall IPD correlation of two connections is a two-step process. First, the two 
connections to be correlated are processed to generate a number of correlation points 
between the two connections. Second, these generated correlation points are evaluated 
to obtain the correlation value of the two connections. 6      Xinyuan Wang†, Douglas S. Reeves†‡, S. Felix Wu†† 
The rationale behind this two-step process is to support the true real-time 
correlation, which is the capability to correlate “live” traffic when they come and go. 
This means that the approach must be able to correlate connections before their ends 
are reached. Therefore, the correlation metric for true real-time correlation cannot be 
defined over the entire duration of a connection; we choose instead to compute it over 
a window of packets in the connection. A correlation point generated from IPDs 
within the window reflects some localized similarity between the two flows; the 
correlation value obtained from all the correlation points will indicate the overall 
similarity of the two flows. 
4.1.1  Basic IPD Correlation Concepts and Definitions 
Given a bi-directional connection, we can split it into two unidirectional flows. We 
define our correlation metric over the unidirectional flow of connections. 
Given a unidirectional flow of n > 1 packets, we use ti to represent the timestamp 
of the i
th packet observed at some point of the network. We assume all the ti’s of a 
flow are measured at the same observation point with the same clock. We define the 
i
th inter-packet delay (IPD) as 
 d i = ti+1 – ti   (4.1) 
Therefore, for any flow consisting of n > 1 packets, we can measure the inter-
packet delay (IPD) vector <d1, …, dn-1>. 
Ideally, the IPD vector would uniquely identify each flow and we could construct 
our correlation metric from the IPD vectors. To support real-time correlation based on 
the IPD vector, we define the IPD correlation window Wj, s on <d1, …, dn> as 
 W j, s (<d1, …, dn>) = <dj, …, dj+s-1> (4.2) 
where 1 ≤ j ≤ n represents the starting point of the window, and 1 ≤ s ≤ n-j+1 is the 
size of the window. 
Given any two flows X and Y, whose IPD vectors are <x1, …xm> and <y1, …yn> 
respectively, we define a Correlation Point Function CPF over IPD correlation 
windows of X: Wj,s (X) and of Y: Wj+k,s (Y) as 
 CPF(X, Y, j, k, s) = φ (Wj, s (X), Wj+k, s (Y))  (4.3) 
where φ is a function of two vectors: R
s × R
s → [0, 1], 1 ≤ j ≤ min (m-s+1, n-k-s+1) 
is the start of the IPD correlation window, -j+1 ≤ k ≤ n-j-s+1 is the offset between the 
two IPD correlation windows, and 1 ≤ s ≤ min (m, n) is the size of the two IPD 
correlation windows. CPF(X, Y, j,  k,  s) quantitatively expresses the correlation 
between Wj, s (<x1, …xm>) and Wj+k, s (<y1, …yn>) as shown in Figure 4.1. 
Because the value of CPF(X, Y, j, k, s) changes as j and k changes, we can think of 
CPF(X, Y, j, k, s) as a function of j and k. Given any particular value of j, CPF(X, Y, 
Flow Y: y1,…, yj+k,…,yj+k+s-1,…yn
Flow X: x1,…, xj,…,xj+s-1,…xm
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j, k, s) may have a different value for each different value of  k. We are interested in 
the maximum value of CPF(X, Y, j, k, s) for any particular value of j. 
We define (j, j+k) as a correlation point if  
1 1
) , , , , ( max
+ − − ≤ ≤ + −
≥
s j n k j
s k j Y X CPF cp δ  (4.4) 
where δcp is the correlation point threshold with value between 0 and 1. The δcp 
here is for detecting correlation point and is different from δ in inequality (3.3). 
We further define k for this correlation point (j, j+k) as the correlation-offset of 
CPF(X, Y, j, k, s) and the correlation point. 
Given flow X, Y, correlation window size s and threshold δcp, by applying formula 
(4.4), we can obtain a series of correlation points: (x1, y1), (x2, y2),… (xn, yn) where n ≥ 
0.  
Assuming one packet of flow X corresponds to one packet of flow Y3, if flow X 
and Y are really part of the same connection chain, the IPDs of flow X should have a 
one-to-one correspondence with the IPDs of flow Y. In this case, all the correlation 
points should have same correlation-offset. This can be formally represented with 
CPF as 
1 1
)] , , , , ( max
) , ' , , , ( [ '
+ − − ≤ ≤ + −
= ∀ ∃
s j n k j
s k j Y X CPF
s k j Y X CPF j k  (4.5) 
That is there exists an offset k’ such that CPF(X, Y, j, k’, s) is closest to 1 for all 
possible j. In this case, all the correlation points (x, y) will be covered by a linear 
function y=x+k’. 
After obtaining n>0 correlation points: (j1, j1+k1), (j2,  j2+k2), …, (jn,  jn+kn), we 
represent those n correlation points with two n-dimensional vectors Cx=< j1, … jn> and 
Cy=< j 1+k1, … jn+kn>. The Correlation Value Function formula (3.3) is now 
transformed to 
 CVF(Cx, Cy) ≥ δ (4.6) 
In summary, the metric function M in formula (3.1) is now mapped to CPF, the 
parameter domain P in formula (3.1) is mapped to s and δcp, and Z in formula (3.1) is 
mapped to n-dimensional vectors Cx=< j1, … jn> and Cy=< j1+k1, … jn+kn>. 
4.1.2 Correlation  Method  Assessment  Criteria 
A critical issue in this method is the choice of the function φ  for computing the 
correlation point function CPF.  Criteria by which the method may be judged include: 
 
•  Uniqueness of perfect correlation: for a flow X, no flow Y not in the same 
connection chain as X should have CPF(X, Y, j, k, s) =1. 
•  Correlation Point (CP) true positives (hits): this is the number of packets that 
should be correlated, and are found to be correlated according to equation 4.4.  
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The true positive rate is the number of hits divided by the number of packets 
that should be correlated. 
•  Correlation Point (CP) false positives (misses): this is the number of packets 
which are not in fact correlated, but which are found to be correlated according 
to equation 4.4. 
 
Ideally, we would expect a perfect correlation method 1) has unique perfect 
correlation; 2) has a 100% CP true positive rate; and 3) has 0 misses or false positives. 
4.2  Correlation Point Functions 
We now propose four correlation point functions, each of which enjoys certain 
advantages or applicability, as discussed below. 
4.2.1  Mini/Max Sum Ratio (MMS) 
One simple metric to quantitatively express the “similarity” between two vectors is 
the ratio between the summation of the minimum elements and the summation of the 
maximum elements. 
∑
∑
+ +
= +
+ +
= +
=
1
1
) , max(
) , min(
) , , , , (
s j
j i k i i
s j
j i k i i
MMS
y x
y x
s k j Y X CPF  (4.7) 
The range of CPF(X, Y, j, k, s)MMS is [0, 1]. Only when xi=yi+k for i=j, …, j+k-1, 
will CPF(X, Y, j, k, s) MMS have the value 1 . Therefore, CPF(X, Y, j, k, s) MMS is likely 
to exhibit unique perfect correlation. 
4.2.2 Statistical  Correlation  (STAT) 
Based on the concept of the coefficient of correlation from statistics 
[1], we can define 



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≥
=
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The range of CPF(X, Y, j, k, s)Stat is also [0, 1]. Unlike CPF(X, Y, j, k, s)MMS, for a 
given Wj,s(X), there may be more than one value of Wj+k,s(Y) for which CPF(X, Y, j, k, 
s)Stat has the value 1. For example, for a particular Wj,s(X), any linear transform of 
Wj,s(X): Wj+k,s(Y) =a×Wj,s(X) +b will result in CPF(X, Y, j, k, s)Stat being equal to 1 
(a>0) or –1 (a<0). CPF(X, Y, j, k, s)Stat is therefore less likely to exhibit unique perfect 
correlation, and is more likely to result in false positives.  Inter-Packet Delay Based Correlation for Tracing Encrypted Connections Through 
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4.2.3  Normalized Dot Product 1 (NDP1) 
In digital signal processing, linear correlation (or matched filtering) of two discrete 
signals will reach a maximum at the point where the signals have the most similarity. 
It is well known that linear correlation is optimal in detecting the similarity between a 
discrete signal and the corresponding signal distorted by additive, white Gaussian 
noise. However the range of linear correlation is not necessarily between 0 and 1. 
If the discrete signals are replaced by two vectors, the corresponding operation to 
linear correlation of signals is the inner-product or dot-product of two vectors in n-
dimensional space. From linear algebra, the inner-product (or dot-product) of two n-
dimensional vectors is equal to the cosine of the angle between the two vectors, 
multiplied by the lengths of the two vectors. That is: 
  | ) ( | | ) ( | ) cos( ) ( ) ( Y W X W Y W X W × × = • θ  (4.9) 
or 
 
| ) ( | | ) ( |
) ( ) (
) cos(
Y W X W
Y W X W
×
•
= θ ) (4.10) 
where θ is the angle between vector W(X) and W(Y), and |W(X)| and |W(Y)| are 
the lengths of vector W(X) and W(Y) respectively.4 
cos(θ) in (4.10) can be used as a correlation point function. The range of cos(θ) is 
[-1, 1] and it provides a measure of the similarity of two vectors. For any vector 
Wj,s(X), cos(θ) will be 1 for any vector Wj+k,s(Y) =a×Wj,s(X) +b. 
To make the correlation point function more likely to exhibit unique perfect 
correlation, we can define it as follows: 
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θ
 (4.11) 
Because xi and yi are non negative, the range of CPF(X, Y, j, k, s)NDP1 is [0, 1].  It 
can be shown that CPF(X, Y, j, k, s) NDP1 will be 1 only when Wj,s(X) = Wj+k,s(Y).  
Therefore, CPF(X, Y, j, k, s)NDP1 is likely to exhibit unique perfect correlation. 
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4.2.4  Normalized Dot Product 2 (NDP2) 
Another way to normalize the dot-product of two vectors is  
 
[]
2 1
1
2
) , max(
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∑
∑
− +
= +
− +
= + ×
=
s j
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s j
j i k i i
NDP
y x
y x
s k j Y X CPF  (4.12) 
Because xi and yi are non negative, the range of CPF(X, Y, j, k, s)NDP2 is [0, 1]. It is 
obvious that CPF(X, Y, j, k, s)NDP2 equals1 only when Wj,s(X) = Wj+k,s(Y). 
Among these four proposed correlation point functions, Mini/MaxSum Ratio 
(MMS) is likely to be the most sensitive to local details of the IPD vectors to be 
correlated.  This is because it does not average any differences, and it accumulates all 
the IPD differences. As a result, MMS may potentially have a lower true positive rate 
due to its emphasis on local details. While the STAT CPF is much more robust to 
noise, we expect it to have substantially more false positives.  The normalized dot 
product functions (NDP1 and NDP2) are likely to be in between MMS and STAT in 
terms of sensitivity to local detail and robustness to noise. 
4.3 Correlation  Value  Function 
Given flows X, Y, correlation window size s and threshold δ, by applying formula 
(4.4), we can potentially obtain a set of correlation points: (j1, j1+k1), (j2, j2+k2), …, (jn, 
jn+kn). We represent this sequence of correlation points through two n-dimensional 
vectors Cx=< j1, … jn> and Cy=< j1+k1, … jn+kn>. 
We define the overall Correlation Value Function CVF of flows X and Y from this 
sequence of correlation points, as follows: 

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CVF(Cx,Cy) quantitatively expresses the overall correlation between flows X and 
Y, and its value range is [-1, 1]. When there exists more than one correlation point 
and all the correlation points have same correlation offset (i.e., k1=k2 =…kn), 
CVF(Cx,Cy) = 1. When flow X and Y has only one correlation point, CVF(Cx,Cy)=1. 
When flow X and Y have no correlation point, CVF(Cx,Cy) is defined to be 0. 
4.4 Limitations  and  Countermeasures 
The effectiveness of IPD-based correlation relies on the uniqueness of IPDs of 
connections. It may be ineffective at differentiating uncorrelated connections that 
exhibit very similar IPD patterns, such as file transfers accomplished via FTP. Inter-Packet Delay Based Correlation for Tracing Encrypted Connections Through 
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Interactive traffic, as we show later in the experiments section, usually has IPD 
patterns that are distinctive enough for our purposes. 
Intruders could thwart IPD-based correlation by deliberately changing the inter-
packet delays of a connection in a chain.  Such delays may be designed to reduce the 
true positive rate, or increase the number of false positives.  There are relatively 
simple means of accomplishing such traffic shaping, although they may require 
kernel-level manipulations.  The amount of delay that can be added by the intruder is 
limited by the maximum delay that is tolerable for interactive traffic. Another 
countermeasure against IPD-based correlation is to set some connection into line 
mode while keeping other connection in character mode. This could potentially merge 
several packets into one bigger packet. However, the server side shell could always 
dynamically turn off the line mode
[15]. Other countermeasures include: 
•  Injecting “padding” packets that can be removed by the application 
•  Segmenting one flow into multiple flows and reassembling them, again at the 
application level 
It is an area of future work to address such countermeasures. 
5 Experiments 
The goal of the experiments is to answer the following questions about IPD based 
correlation:  
1)  are inter-packet delays preserved through routers and stepping stone, and to 
what extent?  
2)  are inter-packet delays preserved across encryption/decryption and various 
network applications (such as telnet/rlogin/SSH)?  
3)  how effective is the IPD-based correlation metric in detecting connections 
which are part of the same chain?  
4)  how well does the IPD-based correlation metric differentiate a connection 
from connections that are not part of the same chain? 
5.1  Correlation Point Experiment 
To answer the first two questions, we have conducted the following experiment. We 
first telnet’ed from a Windows 2000 PC behind a cable modem connected to an ISP in 
North Carolina to a Sun workstation via VPN.  From the workstation, we used SSH to 
Figure 5.1 Correlation Experiment on telnet and ssh 
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Figure 5.2 Correlation Point between Two Correlated Flows Detected by MMS 
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running Linux at UC Davis, and from there we SSH’ed back to a PC running 
FreeBSD at NC State. As shown in Figure 5.1, the connection chain has a total of 3 
stepping-stones and 59 hops and covers a distance on the order of 10,000 km. The 
connection chain consists of links of different speeds -including residential Internet 
access, typical campus LAN and public Internet backbone. We have captured the 
packet traces at the Windows 2000 node and the FreeBSD node; both traces have a 
timestamp resolution of 1 microsecond. We label the telnet return path5 flow from the 
Sun workstation to the Windows 2000 PC flow X, and the SSH backwards flow from 
the FreeBSD PC to the Linux PC flow Y. Therefore, flow X consists of telnet packets 
and flow Y consists of SSH packets. 
We have calculated the IPD vectors after filtering out the following sources of 
errors: 
•  Duplicated packets 
•  Retransmitted packets 
•  ACK only packets 
We then calculated correlation points (j, k) by applying (4.4) using each of the four 
correlation point functions, with different correlation window sizes s and correlation 
point thresholds δcp.   
Figure 5.2 shows the correlation points between flow X and Y obtained by the 
MMS CPF with different correlation window sizes s and thresholds δcp. In these plots, 
a point at position (j, k) indicates inequality (4.4) was true for that value of j, k, s and 
δcp.  True positives are points located along the major diagonal.  False positives are 
points located off the major diagonal. 
With correlation window size of 5 and δcp threshold of 0.70, there are a large 
number of falsely detected correlation points (false positives) in addition to the true 
correlation points (true positives).  The overall CVF value (equation (4.13)) for this 
case is 0.1707.  With larger correlation window size, or a higher threshold δcp, MMS 
results in fewer false positives and has a higher CVF value, as would be expected. At 
correlation window size 15, and a threshold δcp of 0.70, MMS detects most of the true 
correlation points between flow X and Y, finds no false positives, and has an overall 
CVF value of 0.9999. When the threshold δcp is increased to 0.95 with the same 
correlation window size of 15, MMS detects substantially fewer correlation points 
between flow X and Y, with no false positives, and has an overall CVF value of 1.0.  
This suggests that with correlation window size 15, the threshold δcp of 0.95 is 
probably too high for MMS. The correlation points missed by correlation windows 
size 15 and threshold δcp of 0.95 are actually due to correlation-offset shifts. The 
correlation-offset between our sample flows X and Y has shifted 3 times between the 
start and finish. This indicates that a telnet packet may trigger more than one SSH 
packet, or vice versa. Fortunately, such correlation-offset shifts are infrequent 
between correlated flows. Generally, a larger correlation window size is very effective 
in filtering out false positives, and a higher threshold δcp tends to filter out both true 
positive and false positive correlation points. An excessively large correlation window 
size with a high threshold δcp tends to have a low true positive rate, due to both 
                                                             
5 The “return path” is the echoed traffic generated on the destination host and sent to the 
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correlation-offset shifts and IPD variations introduced by the network. 
Figure 5.3 compares the detected correlation points between flow X and Y by 
different CPFs: MMS, STAT, NDP1 and NDP2, with identical correlation window 
sizes of 10 and threshold δcp of 0.80. As expected, the statistical CPF results in 
substantially more false positives than the other three CPFs. While NDP2 has slightly 
fewer false positives than NDP1, they both have somewhat more false positives than 
MMS. Generally, MMS is very sensitive to localized details of IPDs and is able to 
accurately correlate the flows using a smaller correlation window (i.e. 5). NDP1 and 
NDP2 are less effective with a small correlation window, but they are able to correlate 
effectively with a moderate window size (15 or 20). The statistical CPF appears to fail 
to consider enough localized details to correlate accurately 
5.2  Aggregated Flow Correlation Experiment 
To evaluate more generally the performance of the different correlation point 
functions, we have used five sets of flows (Table 5.1). FS1 and FS2 were collected at 
two ends of connection chains similar to the scenario shown in Figure 5.1. FS1 and 
FS2 contain 16 SSH flows and 15 Telnet flows, respectively; for each flow in FS2, 
there is one flow in FS1 which was in the same connection chain.  FS3 and FS4 are 
derived from 5 million packet headers and 12 million packet headers of the Auckland-
IV traces of NLANR 
[6]. FS5 is derived from over 49 million packet headers of the 
Bell Lab-I traces of NLANR 
[6].  
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Figure 5.3 Correlation Points Detected by MMS, Stat, NDP1 
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Table 5.1: Traces of Flows Used in Correlation Experiments 
Flow Set  Date  Flow Type  Flow #  Packet # 
FS1 03/02/02  SSH  16  12372 
FS2 03/02/02  Telnet  15  5111 
FS3 02/20/01  Telnet/SSH  144  34344 
FS4 02/26/01  Telnet/SSH  135  38196 
FS5 05/xx/02  SSH  400  364158 
 
We have conducted four sets of aggregated correlation experiments. For all of 
these experiments, two flows were regarded as being correlated if the CVF of their 
correlation points (equation (4.13)) was greater than δ=0.6.The first set tests how well 
different correlation metrics (CPF) detects correlation between sets FS1 and FS2. 
Figure 5.4 shows both the number of true positives (out of a total of 15) and the 
number of false positives (out of 15*15=225) of flow correlation detection with 
different correlation window sizes and correlation point thresholds δcp. 
With a δcp threshold of 0.70, MMS reaches its TP peak of 93% at a correlation 
window size of 20, and NDP2 reaches its TP peak of 80% with a correlation window 
size of 20 or 25. However NDP2 has a significantly higher number of false positives 
at the window size corresponding to its peak true positive rate than does than MMS.  
Both STAT and NDP1 have very low (<7%) TP rates with all correlation window 
size. This indicates that STAT and NDP1 are ineffective with a low δcp threshold. 
For all δcp threshold values, MMS attains its peak TP rate with 0 false positives.  
NDP1 and NDP2 show a similar success rate, with a somewhat higher failure (false 
positive) rate.  STAT is generally not successful at correlating the flows in the same 
chain.  The best results are obtained for the highest δcp threshold setting. MMS is able 
to achieve 100% TP rate with 0 false positives with correlation window size 15, δcp 
threshold 0.90 and window size 10, δcp threshold 0.95. NDP2 is also able to have 
100%TP rate with 0 FP at correlation window size 15, δcp threshold 0.95. NDP1’s 
overall TP peak is 93% with 7% FP at correlation window size 20, δcp threshold 0.90 
The second set of experiments shows the correlation detection effectiveness by 
different correlation metrics. We use combined flow set of FS3 and FS4 (279 flows) 
and flow set FS5 (400 flows) to correlate themselves respectively. Figure 5.5 shows 
the true positive rate of different correlation metric with different correlation window 
size and δcp threshold. Again the STAT correlation point function consistently 
performs poorly. MMS and NDP1 almost have identical correlation detection rates 
across all the correlation window size and δcp threshold combinations in both data 
sets, where NDP1 has little lower detection rate. For flow set FS5, the detection rates 
of both MMS and NDP2 reach 92% and higher with correlation window size 25 or 
bigger. At correlation window size 35, MMS’s and NDP2’s detection rate achieve 
over 97%. For the combined flow set FS3 and FS4, at a correlation window size of 
15, for δcp threshold 0.95, MMS, NDP1and NDP2 all have the highest correlation 
detection rate of 76.7%. This lower detection rate is due to the nature of the flows in 
FS3 and FS4. We have found a number of SSH flows in FS3 and FS4 show very 
similar periodicity, with constant very short IPDs. We suspect they are bulk data 16      Xinyuan Wang†, Douglas S. Reeves†‡, S. Felix Wu†† 
transfers within the SSH connections. This shows a potential limitation of the use of 
IPD-based tracing. 
The third experiment is intended to evaluate the ability of the different correlation 
point functions to successfully discriminate flows not part of the same chain. Figure 
5.6 shows the number of false positives (out of 16*279=4464) when correlating FS1 
and the combined flow set of FS3 and FS4. Because no flow from FS1 correlates with 
any flow from FS3 and FS4, any detected correlation by the correlation metric is a 
false positive. MMS consistently has 0 false positives; and NDP1 and NDP2 false 
positives decrease as the correlation window size increases. The STAT correlation 
point function reports an increasing number of FPs with larger correlation sizes.  
Figure 5.4 True Positive and False Positive of Correlation 
between 16 and 15 Correlated Flows 
True Positive of 15 Correlated  Flow Pairs 
with Threshold 0.70
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 5 10 15 20 25
Correlation Window Size
T
r
u
e
 
P
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
MMS
Stat
NDP1
NDP2
True Positive of 15 Correlated  Flow Pairs 
with Threshold 0.90
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 5 10 15 20 25
Correlation Window Size
T
r
u
e
 
P
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
MMS
Stat
NDP1
NDP2
True Positive of 15 Correlated  Flow Pairs 
with Threshold 0.95
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 5 10 15 20 25
Correlation Window Size
T
r
u
e
 
P
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
MMS
Stat
NDP1
NDP2
False Positive of 15 Correlated  Flow Pairs 
with Threshold 0.70
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 5 10 15 20 25
Correlation Window Size
F
a
l
s
e
 
P
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
MMS
Stat
NDP1
NDP2
True Positive of 15 Correlated  Flow Pairs 
with Threshold  0.80
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 5 10 15 20 25
Correlation Window Size
T
r
u
e
 
P
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
MMS
Stat
NDP1
NDP2
False Positive of 15 Correlated  Flow Pairs 
with Threshold 0.80
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 5 10 15 20 25
Correlation Window Size
F
a
l
s
e
 
P
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
MMS
Stat
NDP1
NDP2
False Positive of 15 Correlated  Flow Pairs 
with Threshold 0.90
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 5 10 15 20 25
Correlation Window Size
F
a
l
s
e
 
P
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
MMS
Stat
NDP1
NDP2
False Positive of 15 Correlated  Flow Pairs 
with Threshold 0.95
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 5 10 15 20 25
Correlation Window Size
F
a
l
s
e
 
P
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
MMS
Stat
NDP1
NDP2Inter-Packet Delay Based Correlation for Tracing Encrypted Connections Through 
Stepping Stones      17 
The fourth experiment similarly investigated the false positive rate, this time 
between sets FS3 and FS4. Figure 5.7 shows the results. The number of false positives 
(out of 144*133 = 19152) for MMS, NDP1 and NDP2 decreases dramatically when 
the correlation window size increases; that of MMS decreases faster than NDP1 and 
NDP2.  Again, the statistical correlation metric has a consistently higher FP rate with 
increasing correlation window size. For the MMS method, a window size of 20 0r 25 
packets is sufficient to reduce the false positive rate to a fraction of a percent. 
In summary, we have found that MMS is very effective in both detecting 
interactive, correlated flows and differentiating uncorrelated flows with even 
relatively small correlation window sizes (10, 15). NDP1 and NDP2 are not as 
sensitive as MMS with small correlation windows; however, they both perform well 
with larger correlation windows. We have confirmed that the statistical correlation 
metric is not effective in detecting correlation and differentiating uncorrelated flows. 
Figure 5.5 True Positive Rate of Correlation between 
279 and 279, 400 and 400 Correlated Flows 
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5.3 Correlation  Performance 
Table 5.2: Throughput (Millions Per Second) of Correlation Point Calculation  
with Correlation Window Size 15 
 40k  379k  937k  2309k  5704k  54210k 
MMS  2.00 1.65 1.74 1.75 1.43 1.35 
STAT  0.90 0.76 0.69 1.14 1.22 1.83 
NDP1  3.99 3.16 2.23 3.25 2.29 3.24 
NDP2  1.33 1.31 1.16 1.37 1.17 1.13 
 
We have measured the number of calculations of correlation points per second 
achieved by our unoptimized code. Table 5.2 shows the average number of millions 
of correlation point calculation per second of various correlation point functions under 
different load. Despite dynamic overheads of disk operation, the overall throughput 
remains largely constant at various loads. 
Conclusions 
Tracing intrusion connections through stepping-stones at real-time is a challenging 
problem, and encryption of some of the connections within the connection chain 
makes tracing even harder. We have addressed the tracing problem of encrypted 
connections based on the inter-packet delays of the connections.  We proposed and 
investigated four correlation point functions.  Our correlation metric does not require 
clock synchronization, and allows correlation of measurements taken at widely 
scattered points. Our method also requires only small packet sequences (on the order 
of a few dozen packets) for correlation. We have found that after some filtering, IPDs 
(Inter-Packet Delay) of both encrypted and unencrypted, interactive connections are 
largely preserved across many hops stepping-stones. We have demonstrated that both 
encrypted and unencrypted, interactive connections can be effectively correlated and 
differentiated based on IPD characteristics. 
Figure 5.7 False Positive of Correlation between 
144 and 135 Uncorrelated Flows 
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Our experiments also indicate that correlation detection is significantly dependent 
on the uniqueness of flows. We have found that normal interactive connections such 
as telnet, SSH and rlogin are almost always unique enough to be differentiated from 
connections not in the same chain. While bulk data transfer with SSH connection 
introduces an additional challenge in correlation detection, its impact on correlation 
differentiation may simply be offset by larger correlation windows and higher 
correlation point thresholds. 
A natural area of future work is to extend the correlation to non-interactive traffic. 
How to address countermeasures with “bogus packets” and packet splitting and 
merging remains an open problem. 
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